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This study conveys the impact of corporate ownership on economic performance of agroholdings 
–  integrated  agricultural,  processing,  marketing,  financial  and  industrial  business  units  in 
Russia’s  agro-food  sector.  Using  a  unique  database  of  the  All-Russian  Nikonov-Institute  of 
Agrarian Problems and Informatics, we investigate 151 agroholdings in Russia and evaluate their 
economic performances for 2006. Applying the multiple linear regression analysis we were able 
to  quantify  corporate  ownership  and  analyze  a  priori  unobserved  factors.  The  results  of  the 
econometric estimation reveal that state ownership exerts negative influence on the economic 
performance of agroholdings. 
 




The presence of business groups is simultaneously well documented as an essential institution of 
corporate  governance  in  industrialized  and  emerging  economies.  The  essence  of  their  economic 
dispensability,  however,  is  frequently  questioned  and  summoned  under  the  pretense  of  existing 
counter-argumentation characteristic in both worlds. Most studies on business group governance and 
ownership effects on their performance encompassed the corporate world of developed countries, 
with particular emphasis paid to the US. In recent years, however, the research also touched upon the 
developing countries. 
 
The economic value of business groups, concomitant to validating the agency theory, is commonly 
measured  by  examining  corporate  ownership  structures  and  firm  performances,  induced  by  the 
premise that upon separation of ownership and control, agents are prone to extract benefits from their 
principals  to  their  own  advantage.  Accordingly,  the  literature  scrutinizing  corporate  ownership 
composition and its impact on firm economic performance consists of positive, negative, as well as 
null evidence, with respect to such relationship.   
 
In  the  US,  many  scholars  found  no  evidence  pertaining  to  any  link  between  firm  economic 
performance  and  ownership  structure,  ownership  change,  board  composition,  and  large 
stockholdings. With regard to Western Europe, ownership concentration and economic performance 
of firms was found to be positive with respect to shareholder value and profitability, although, in 
most cases the relationship generally differed across economies, depending on national systems of 
corporate  governance,  with  the  dominant  shareholders  negatively  impacting  the  long-run 
performance. In Eastern Europe, a positive relationship was found between ownership concentration 
and  corporate  performance,  particularly  when  the  ownership  is  foreign,  and  mixed  of  state  and 2 
 
private. On the negative side, irrespective of the controlling shareholder, large-block shareholdings 
negatively impacted firm investment and performance. In Asia, group affiliated members were found 
to show higher efficiency than non-affiliated ones, however the relationship was also found to vary 
depending on a particular economy, i.e. firm affiliates, as well as industry members, were found to 
have higher profits than non-affiliates in 6 out of 14 countries, lower profits were found in 3 out of 
14 countries, and no significance was found in 5 out of 14 economies. 
 
Methodology and data description 
 
Because the world market economies are exceptionally diverse, there is no consensus reached in the 
literature regarding how to measure corporate performance. Methodologies vary depending on firms’ 
country of origin, legal ownership forms, ownership structures, corporate dimension, and plenty of 
other variables which further complicate the assessment of business groups’ performance. In this 
study  we  employ  land  and  labor  productivities  as  our  prime  economic  performance  indicators, 
measured by revenue, revenue per 1 hectare of land, and revenue per 1 employee, accordingly. 
 
According  DEMSETZ  and  VILLALONGA  (2001),  no  significant  relationships  was  found 
between  shareholder  concentration  and  average  profit  rate,  i.e.  there  was  no  empirical 
relationship  established  between  ownership  structure  and  firm  performance.  Structure  of 
ownership was, therefore, found to vary depending on encountered circumstances, particularly, 
with respect to economies of scale, regulation, and stability of environments the firms operated 
in. Subsequent to the aforementioned logic, we should find no correlation between types of legal 
forms of ownership and performance in Russia’s agroholdings. Notwithstanding, considering the 
wayward  and  unorthodox  nature  of  the  legal,  political  and  socio-economic  environment  in 
Russia, our prime and only hypothesis is as follows: Ownership structure is related to economic 
performance.  
The following is the multiple linear regression model constructed in our study to analyze the 
overall impact of legal types of ownership on economic performance of agroholdings: 
M M R R P P A L S D D D A L S P ln ln ln 0  
(1) 
where  P represents dependent variables for economic performance, i.e. revenue  R , revenue 
per 1 hectare of farmland  RA , and revenue per 1 employee  RE . The agroholdings’ size, 
labor, and land, constituting the independent variables, are depicted by  S ,  L, and  A. The legal 
forms of ownership composed of private, regional, and municipal agroholdings, are denoted by 
R P D D , , and  M D  and signify the control variables in our sample. 
 
Econometric results and Conclusion 
 
The economic performance was evaluated in 151 Russia’s agroholdings in 2006 and was found to be 
positively  correlated.  The  State  shareholding  ownership  negatively  influenced  an  agroholding 
performance,  in  general,  with  private  ownership  positively  impacting  its  revenue.  Regional  and 
municipal  ones  negatively  influenced  agroholdings’  performance,  but  were  not  statistically 
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